Competition Law Forum Discussion
Doug Gurr's First 100 Days: Reform and Refocusing
On Monday 7 July 2025, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) held a roundtable discussion on Doug Gurr's first 100 days: reform and refocusing. The discussion brought together leaders from business, government, and civil society. We have summarised some of the key themes from the conversation below:
How is the CMA being perceived?
At least until recently, the CMA was increasingly been viewed (rightly or wrongly) by some parts of the business and investment community as a potential obstacle to innovation and inward investment, particularly by international investors and fast-moving sectors. Are current processes fully aligned with the commercial realities faced by start-ups, such as founder exits, investment cycles, and market urgency? It was argued that the growing frustration from US investors toward UK merger control is not simply a lobbying exercise, rather it reflects a deeper unease with how merger policy is implemented in practice. The recent dismissal of Martin Bokkerink from the CMA board was widely noted. For some, it marked a turning point, raising questions about transparency, predictability, and the confidence of key stakeholders in a steady, independent agency.
The CMA's approach to foreign-foreign (F-F) mergers has also drawn attention, with claims of overreach and unpredictability, arguing it weakens the UK's global competitiveness. Oversight mechanisms like judicial review have been seen as too generous to the CMA, and to slow and costly, to offer real recourse. Suggestions were made that the need for the CMA to persuade independent judges in full CAT hearings to block a deal (especially a F-F one) could help restore investor trust. But views differed. Some questioned the value of such a shift, given the likely costs and delays of litigation in already unpredictable markets. Others argued the core issue is judicial review's deferential standard, coupled with remittal (a re-run) as the only remedy, such that cost and delay was already a system feature but without the legitimacy of a "day in court".
Worries about independence were also raised. While little was said explicitly, attendees pointed to a need to revisit how non-executive directors—including Chairs—balance oversight and autonomy. Behavioural economics was cited as a useful lens through which decision-making could be improved, particularly in tackling groupthink, confirmation bias, and institutional careerism, but these challenges may apply as much to the boardroom as to case teams.
Why are we where we are?
Some but not all of these pressures stem from the CMA's post-Brexit expansion: some of the most controversial interventions (e.g. involving blocked deals with no UK target revenues or assets) pre-date Brexit and were too small to be caught by EU merger review, while several other high-profile F2F prohibitions were parallel UK/EU cases only possible as a result of Brexit. Although over 2003-24, F-F cases make up only 16% of Enterprise Act reviews that were subject to UK review and did not proceed, that percentage rose markedly in recent years and a small
number of cases dominate headlines and international perception of the CMA's role. As a result, when the CMA diverges from global counterparts, as in the Microsoft/Activision decision, questions about UK proportionality quickly follow.
Several contributors acknowledged the difficulty of the CMA's position, as alongside merger control, it now plays a growing role in areas such as digital regulation, industrial strategy, and national security. As expectations have grown, so too have the trade-offs it must navigate, between legal certainty, investor confidence, public accountability, and market access. But has its internal capacity developed at the same pace? Some argued that without clearer strategic direction and prioritisation, the institution risks being stretched too thin—expected to act simultaneously as regulator, enforcer, and policy adviser, often without the governance structures to support this. The cost of being stretched too thin means there is insufficient time for strategic thinking. This has had a knock-on effect on strategic and public engagement functions needed for a regulator of this scale and visibility. While ministers hoped that formal independence would lead to better outcomes, both political and market confidence has since begun to falter. The question that has been raised is not simply about policy choices, but about whether the Government has equipped the CMA to deliver on its expanded mandate in a way that aligns with the wider direction of UK economic policy.
What might a path forward look like?
As the challenges facing the CMA are acknowledged, the harder task is deciding how to fix them. While politicians certainly bear some responsibility, some blamed (rightly or wrongly) the CMA's short-termism and lack of strategic vision as problems rooted inside the organisation itself. The CMA has itself announced an extensive package of reforms in February and follow-ups since to address process and cultural factors that can be improved short of legislative change.
At the roundtable, there was consensus that reform should begin with governance. One proposal discussed was a rebalancing of decision-making powers. Under this model, non-executive directors, led by the Chair, would hold responsibility for initiating investigations and explaining those decisions to the public. The Chief Executive would be excluded from Phase 1 decisions, but would chair Phase 2 panels taking responsibility for public explanation at the conclusion of cases. For supporters of this approach, clearer delineation of roles could help restore transparency, reinforce independence, and improve external trust in the process. Others were of the view that the administrative model was out of date post-Brexit and that for legitimacy a world- class regime should move to a prosecutorial model in which the CMA challenges mergers and the CAT decides, subject to appeal, as applies to antitrust cases; the English courts were voluntarily chosen by international business to resolve important disputes because they are globally regarded as offering rigorous quality, efficiency and independence from politics.
Others suggested that further investment in strategic thinking and public engagement is urgently needed, noting that leadership might benefit from viewing communication not as a risk to independence, but as a tool for legitimacy. Establishing open, consistent feedback loops with high-growth and innovation-driven sectors, such as AI, biotech, or digital markets, could make the
CMA more responsive and better attuned to emerging economic realities. While there was no clear consensus on solutions, there was broad agreement that a moment of reflection is needed.
Ultimately, there was unison that the CMA's current challenges are not solely political in nature. Rather, they reflect a mix of structural, strategic, and cultural factors that have built up over time. Whether reform comes from within or is prompted by external intervention, the task ahead is clear: to assist the CMA in delivering modern, effective, and independent competition enforcement and digital regulation that is capable of adapting to the demands of today's economy.
