Trading Fish or Human Rights in Western Sahara?
Self-Determination, Non-Recognition and the EC-Morocco Fisheries Agreement

Dr. Martin Dawidowicz

Introduction
It is notoriously difficult to cross a desert. This is still so when the final destination is clear. Biblical figures famously experienced many difficulties in the desert during their exodus even as the vision of the final destination was divinely revealed to them. Likewise, it appears that the international community (albeit absent any divine intervention) has spent almost forty years in the “frontierless sea of sand”\(^1\) of Western Sahara without finding its way. And yet the direction of travel has always been clear. International law may not provide for a promised land of milk and honey in any biblical sense but it does provide for the basic right of peoples to self-determination – a point emphatically reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’, ‘the Court’) in its 1975 advisory opinion in *Western Sahara*.\(^2\)

In *Western Sahara*, the Court denied that Morocco and Mauritania had any ties of territorial sovereignty to Western Sahara and affirmed the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination. But this cardinal right has seemingly only manifested itself as a forlorn mirage in the desert. Morocco is still denying this right and purports to exercise territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara. Almost forty years later, the international community is yet to ensure the people of Western Sahara the realization of their own promised land in accordance with the right of self-determination under

---

* Associate, Lalive, Geneva. PhD (Cantab); M.Jur (Oxon); Jur.Kand (Stockholm). Comments are welcome (martin.dawidowicz@cantab.net). This contribution is forthcoming in D. French (ed.), *Statehood, Self-Determination and Minorities: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law* (Cambridge University Press 2013).

1 *Western Sahara*, ICJ Rep (1975), Dec. Judge Gros, p. 71
international law. Worse still, it appears that important actors in the international community may effectively be forestalling the effective exercise of this basic right.

A recent example in point concerns the controversy surrounding the temporary renewal in February 2011 of the 2006 EC-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement (‘the FPA’). The FPA grants EC vessels certain fishing rights off Morocco’s Atlantic coast – one of the richest fishing grounds in the world. The FPA has remained controversial since its reference to ‘Moroccan waters’ does not explicitly exclude the waters off the coast of Western Sahara. The controversy stems from the concern that the FPA might in practice allow for the exploitation of the natural resources of Western Sahara in a manner contrary to the fundamental right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and as such might serve as an implicit recognition of Morocco’s irredentist claim to territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara. However, in December 2011, the Council of the European Union terminated with immediate effect the temporary extension of the FPA. While this is a positive development, as we shall see below, it remains uncertain whether a renewed FPA, which the EC remains committed to conclude with Morocco, will fully comply with international law.

The analysis in this chapter will proceed as follows. Section I outlines the content and scope of the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination. Section II examines whether Morocco’s actions in relation to Western Sahara are tantamount to denying that basic right; an affirmative answer is provided to this question. Section III makes some general observations about the obligation of non-recognition and its putative application in relation to the denial of the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination. Section IV evaluates whether the FPA is consistent with the obligation of EU member States not to recognize Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara. Finally, section V offers some concluding observations.

I. The Right of the People of Western Sahara to Self-Determination

On 26 December 1884, during its participation in the Berlin Conference, Spain
proclaimed by royal decree a protectorate over present-day Western Sahara. Although the golden age of so-called ‘salt-water colonialism’ may have reached its apex with the 1885 General Act of the Berlin Conference, ‘the setting of the sun on the age of colonial imperium’ soon appeared on the horizon. Nevertheless, it was not until 1960 that the UN General Assembly famously adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by which it declared the right of self-determination applicable to all trust and non-self governing territories (‘NSGT’). In the same year, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 1541 (XV) by which it provided additional guidance on the decolonization process within the meaning of the UN Charter.

In this resolution, the General Assembly provided a definition of a NSGT as enshrined in Article 73 of the UN Charter; in short, a NSGT was described as a colonial territory whose people had not yet attained a ‘full measure of self-government’. In principle, such self-government would be reached by means of a process which respected the ‘freely expressed wishes of the people’ in a free and fair referendum providing for three broad modes of implementation; namely, (1) emergence as a sovereign independent State; (2) free association with an independent State; or (3) integration with an independent State.

At least in a traditional sense, the core right of peoples to self-determination can thus be described as a process right aimed at safeguarding the expression of the free and autonomous will of a people to dispose of their destiny as they wish. In short, as Judge Dillard observed in Western Sahara, ‘self-determination is satisfied by a free choice not

---

4 See GA Res 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960 (Principle IV).
6 GA Res. 1514 (XV) of 15 December 1960. See already GA Res. 637(A) (VII) of 16 December 1952.
7 GA Res. 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960 (Principle I).
8 GA Res. 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960 (Principles VI-IX). See already GA Res. 742 (XIII) of 27 November 1953; GA Res. 648 (VII) of 10 December 1952; GA Res. 567 (VI) of 18 January 1952 (all emphasizing the element of free choice – and the corresponding option of independence – as a factor in determining whether a NSGT has attained a ‘full measure of self-government’ in accordance with Chapter XI of the UN Charter).
by a particular consequence of that choice or a particular method of exercising it. Under Article 73 of the UN Charter, the responsibility to ensure the successful completion of this process, a ‘sacred trust’ no less, falls on the administrating power of the NSGT.

In 1965, after some years of Spanish intransigence, the UN General Assembly called on Spain, identified as ‘administering Power’ under Chapter XI of the UN Charter, to take immediate steps towards the decolonization of Western Sahara in accordance with the right of self-determination. In 1966, the General Assembly made more specific demands and requested Spain, in consultation with other parties (Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria), to organize a referendum in Western Sahara under UN auspices in order to enable the people of Western Sahara to exercise freely its right to self-determination. But in the waning years of the Franco regime, notwithstanding repeated calls from the General Assembly, little progress was made towards the realization of this right. An apparent breakthrough came in August 1974 when Spain finally committed itself to the holding of a referendum in the first half of 1975 and even successfully completed a census to that effect.

In theory, Morocco assented to a referendum on the future status of Western Sahara but subject to a strong caveat. On repeated occasions since at least November 1958, when Spain had reaffirmed its sovereignty over Western Sahara, Morocco vigorously protested that Western Sahara formed an integral part of Moroccan territory. In practice, Morocco therefore felt compelled to publicly express its strong opposition to a free vote in the planned referendum – entailing the option of outright independence for Western Sahara –

---

10 In November 1958, less than three years after becoming a UN member, Spain declared that Western Sahara was a Spanish province and that it therefore did not qualify as a NSGT under Chapter XI of the UN Charter. Morocco promptly protested on the basis that Western Sahara formed an integral part of Moroccan territory. See Western Sahara, ICJ Rep (1975), p. 25, para. 34.
12 GA Res. 2229 (XXI) of 20 December 1966.
14 See Letter dated 20 August 1974 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/9714.
on the grounds that it had historic ties to the territory.\textsuperscript{16} In Morocco’s view, the option of full independence was excluded under the UN decolonization law in \textit{statu nascendi} since the right of self-determination was circumscribed by the overriding principle of territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{17} In essence, Morocco’s position was that its historical ties to Western Sahara justified ‘the reintegration or retrocession of the territory without consulting the [Western Saharan] people.’\textsuperscript{18} Put bluntly, Morocco presented the issue as essentially one of ‘colonial amputation’.\textsuperscript{19}

With full independence for Western Sahara now a real possibility, Morocco (later assisted by Mauritania) sought, as a minimum, to postpone the planned referendum. It successfully did so by proposing that the General Assembly request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the status of Western Sahara. On 13 December 1974, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3292 (XXIX) by which it sought advice from the Court on a rather limited question; namely, Morocco’s putative historical claim to Western Sahara at the time of Spain’s colonization in 1884.\textsuperscript{20} However, the General Assembly took special care to ensure that the language of the resolution was without prejudice to the application of the decolonization principles embodied in resolution 1514 (XV).

In light of this request, resolution 3292 (XXIX) urged Spain to postpone the planned referendum until the General Assembly would be in a position to decide on the policy to be adopted following receipt of the advisory opinion from the ICJ. Moreover, in line with established UN practice on decolonization,\textsuperscript{21} the General Assembly requested its Fourth (Decolonization) Committee to send a visiting mission to Western Sahara in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{17} GA Res. 1514 (XV) of 15 December 1960 (op. para. 6); GA Res. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, (principle 5, para. 7). See also Western Sahara, ICJ Rep (1975), Sep. Op. Judge Petren, p. 110 (for recognition of the intricate interplay between the two principles enshrined in GA Res. 1514 (XV) forming part of the ‘veritable law of decolonization in the course of taking shape’).}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{18} See Western Sahara, ICJ Rep (1975), Dec. Judge Nagendra Singh, p. 79; \textit{ibid.} Sep. Op. Judge Dillard, p. 120 (i.e. a case of “automatic retrocession” based on the principle of territorial integrity embodied in op. para. 6 of resolution 1514 (XV)).}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{19} To use the stark terms of Judge Dillard (Sep. Op.) in Western Sahara, ICJ Rep (1975), p. 120.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{20} GA Res. 3292 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 (83-0-43). For the debate in the plenary see UN Doc. A/PV.2318.}  
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{21} GA Res. 850 (IX) of 22 November 1954 (op. para. 2). For a brief discussion see R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), \textit{Oppenheim’s International Law}, vol. I (9\textsuperscript{th} ed. 1992), p. 713.}
order to evaluate the opinion of the population as to the possible change of status they might desire and report back to the Assembly on its findings at its next session. Two parallel UN processes were thus set in motion.

As it happened, while the ICJ in Western Sahara recognized that there might be an exception to the general principle of self-determination based on territorial integrity, it rejected in categorical terms ‘any tie of territorial sovereignty between … Western Sahara and … Morocco’. Having unmistakably rejected any Moroccan claims to territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara, the Court turned to the putative right of self-determination and the modes for its implementation.

The ICJ first reiterated its position – espoused four years earlier in Namibia – that the principle of self-determination applied to all NSGTs, including Western Sahara. The Court went on to refer to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) which ‘provided the basis for the process of decolonization’ as ‘complemented’ by General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV). It noted that the right of self-determination provides the General Assembly with ‘a measure of discretion’ regarding the manner in which the right is to be realized. At the same time, however, the Court recognized the three main different modes of implementation of the right of self-determination embodied in resolution 1541 (XV) and emphasized that this resolution gave effect to the ‘essential feature’ of the right of self-determination, namely, ‘the basic need to take account of the freely expressed wishes of the territory’s people’. The General Assembly’s procedural discretion was accordingly circumscribed by the principle of free choice. Thus defined, the Court recognized the right of peoples to self-determination as forming part of customary international law.

In sum, while it is true that the modes of implementation of the right of self-

---

22 This is clear from the Court’s detailed treatment of Morocco’s claim that would have been futile in the event that no exception could ever prevail over the right to self-determination. See further e.g. Western Sahara, ICJ Rep (1975), Dec. Judge Gros, pp. 70, 73; ibid. Sep. Op. Judge Dillard, p. 120.
24 Western Sahara, ICJ Rep (1975), p. 31, para. 54.
determination may not always be clear, the ‘essential feature’ of the right nonetheless resides in the principle of free choice, entailing the option of a ‘right to independence’ – a point most recently reaffirmed (though not per se endorsed) by the Court in the Kosovo opinion.\(^{26}\) It remained for the General Assembly to determine the wishes of the indigenous population. On 7 November 1975, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly adopted the anticipated report of the UN visiting mission. The report concluded in categorical terms that ‘the majority of the population within the Spanish Sahara was manifestly in favour of independence’.\(^{27}\) The guidance provided by UN organs on the procedure to be followed by the General Assembly in the decolonization of Western Sahara seemed clear.

As is well-known, in spite of this unambiguous advice, the implementation of the right of self-determination in Western Sahara has been fraught with difficulty. In fact, despite the clear opinion provided by the International Court in Western Sahara, Morocco promptly proceeded to take a number of unilateral steps that resulted in the denial of the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination – a situation that endures to this day.

II. The Denial of the Right of Self-Determination

On 17 October 1975, purportedly basing itself on the legal ties affirmed by the ICJ a day before, Morocco announced its plan for the so-called ‘Green March’ of 350,000 unarmed civilians into Western Sahara ‘in order to gain recognition of its right to national unity and territorial integrity’.\(^{28}\) Morocco declared that its action should be understood as ‘a manifestation of the unanimous will of the Moroccan people to assert its legitimate right

---


over its Sahara’. Morocco even boldly proclaimed that ‘a referendum was not necessary [since] the populations of the territory had already exercised de facto self-determination and declared themselves in favour of the return of the territory to Morocco’. These wishes had allegedly been expressed on 4 November 1975 in a ceremony held in the city of Agadir by means of an ‘oath of allegiance’ to King Hassan II of Morocco taken by the servile President of the Yema’a (an indigenous local assembly established by Spain in 1967) on behalf of the Saharan tribes.

In effect, Morocco appeared determined to create a situation in which the carefully elaborated UN position on the decolonization of Western Sahara would simply be ‘overtaken by events’. Spain decried an imminent Moroccan ‘invasion’ and called for an emergency session of the Security Council. In the next few weeks, the Security Council adopted three resolutions on the matter, inter alia, requesting the UN Secretary-General to enter into immediate consultations with the parties. But to no avail.

On 6 November 1975, the day before the official adoption of the report of the UN visiting mission, Morocco initiated the Green March. The Security Council deplored the action on the same day and called for Morocco’s immediate withdrawal. Spain informed the Council that Morocco would not halt the march unless urgent bilateral negotiations ‘dealing with the transfer of sovereignty over the Sahara to Morocco’ were initiated. It was said that unless Spain acceded to such negotiations, ‘a state of belligerency’ between the two countries might ensue. Morocco categorically denied the

---

30 Ibid., para. 17 (emphasis in the original).
31 Ibid., para. 17. See also Letter dated 10 December 1975 from the representative of Algeria to the Secretary-General on behalf of the Saharan Provisional National Council, UN Doc. S/11903 (denouncing the spurious petition).
32 Ibid., para. 17.
34 SC Res. 377 (22 October 1975); SC Res. 379 (2 November 1975); SC Res. 380 (6 November 1975).
35 SC Res. 380 (6 November 1975); Letter dated 6 November 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/11867.
existence of such a bellicose ultimatum.\textsuperscript{37} In fact, Spain had already publicly expressed two weeks earlier that it was confronted with a \textit{fait accompli} and declared that ‘in practice the two aspects of the question [i.e. the situation created by the Green March and the decolonization policy concerning Western Sahara] could not be separated’.\textsuperscript{38}

On 14 November 1975, even as Morocco had withdrawn the marchers a few days earlier,\textsuperscript{39} Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed the so-called Madrid Declaration.\textsuperscript{40} For Western Sahara, to whom Spain owed a sacred duty of trust under international law, this was perhaps the unkindest cut of all. The Madrid Declaration provided that Spain would terminate its presence in Western Sahara by 28 February 1976 and, in the interim, it would transfer its responsibilities as administrating power to a temporary tripartite administration composed of the Spanish Governor-General and a Moroccan and Mauritanian Deputy Governor, respectively. The Yema’a, which expressed the views of the Saharan population, would collaborate in this interim administration and its views would be respected. Morocco’s interpretation of the Madrid Declaration was clear. Morocco informed the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy that

the main provision of such an agreement had already been determined and stipulated a transfer of sovereignty from the administrating Power to Morocco and Mauritania. However, Morocco was prepared to submit such an agreement to the competent organs of the United Nations for approval.\textsuperscript{41}

As it happened, this incredulous interpretation was not without merit.

A secret pact between the three States reportedly accompanied the Madrid Declaration and was said to provide for the ultimate partition of Western Sahara between

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Letter dated 7 November 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/11873; UNYB (1975), p. 183.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 377 (1975) Relating to the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/11863, para. 16(b).
\item \textsuperscript{39} Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 379 (1975) Relating to the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/11880, para. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara by Spain, Morocco and Mauritania (entered into force on 19 November 1975), 988 UNTS 259.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Report by the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 379 (1975) Relating to the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/11874, para. 18.
\end{itemize}
Morocco and Mauritania in exchange for Spanish access to important phosphates and fishing resources in the territory.\textsuperscript{42} Some two weeks later, the Yema’a responded to these events by declaring that no further legitimacy would be bestowed on this ‘puppet institution … of Spanish colonialism’ and unanimously decided upon its own final dissolution.\textsuperscript{43} It was not long before Moroccan and Mauritanian armed forces invaded Western Sahara.

Whatever the actual terms of the secret pact, the Madrid Declaration required, as a minimum, the approval of the General Assembly since an administering power cannot unilaterally dispose of a NSGT at will; it does not exercise full powers akin to a territorial sovereign under Chapter XI of the UN Charter (\textit{nemo dat quod non habet}).\textsuperscript{44} Without more, it is therefore difficult to disagree with Brownlie’s conclusion that the Madrid Declaration ‘lacks a legal basis’.\textsuperscript{45} The absence of a legal basis could however be cured by an explicit decision of the United Nations. As it happened, no such explicit decision was adopted.\textsuperscript{46} The UN process was soon overtaken by events.

On 27 February 1976, King Hassan II of Morocco reconvened some former members of the defunct Yema’a in Moroccan-occupied Laayoune for a ‘special session’\textsuperscript{47} and held a spurious petition that ended up endorsing the partition and transfer of territorial sovereignty to the joint occupiers of Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{48} For its part, Spain

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item For a brief discussion (with further references to press reports) see e.g. T. Franck, ‘The Stealing of the Sahara’, 70 AJIL (1976), p. 715; T. Hodges, \textit{Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War} (1983), p. 224. See also Letters dated 9 and 10 December 1975 from the representative of Algeria to the Secretary-General on behalf of the Saharan National Council, UN Docs. S/11902, S/11903.
\item Letter dated 9 December 1975 from the representative of Algeria to the Secretary-General on behalf of the Saharan National Council, UN Doc. S/11902.
\item I. Brownlie, \textit{African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyklopedia} (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1979), p. 149.
\item For the plainly contradictory UN position see GA Res. 3458 A (XXX) of 10 December 1975; GA Res. 3458 B (XXX) of 10 December 1975.
\item See the preamble of the Convention concerning the State frontier established between the Islamic Republic Mauritania and the Kingdom of Morocco (signed at Rabat on 14 April 1976), 1035 UNTS 120.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
officially announced its definite withdrawal from Western Sahara in accordance with the Madrid Declaration and henceforth considered itself ‘exempt from any responsibility of an international nature in connection with the administration of the Territory.’\textsuperscript{49} The Frente Polisario (the national liberation movement of the Western Saharans), engaged in heavy fighting against the invading forces from Morocco and Mauritania, responded to these events by proclaiming independence and the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.\textsuperscript{50} As it happened, the invading forces were gradually gaining control of major parts of the territory.

On 14 April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania purported to formalize their annexation of Western Sahara by signing a boundary treaty that partitioned the territory between them.\textsuperscript{51} However, Mauritania soon proved unable to defend its part of the territory and, on 10 August 1979, it signed a peace agreement with the Frente Polisario in which it agreed to definitively withdraw its armed forces and renounced any territorial claim to Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{52} Moroccan armed forces soon moved to occupy the southern part of Western Sahara vacated by Mauritania. As a final measure, Morocco consolidated its \textit{de facto} annexation and legal claim to territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara by incorporating it under Moroccan domestic law as forming part of four of its sixteen administrative regions.\textsuperscript{53} The old Moroccan nationalist aspiration of the ‘reconstitution of Greater Morocco’\textsuperscript{54} seemed partly fulfilled. But no formal recognition has ever been given to Morocco’s territorial claim.

Since the late 1980s, several UN sponsored solutions have been advanced to

\textsuperscript{50} The text of the proclamation is reproduced at \url{http://www.arso.org/03-1.htm} (last accessed 19 February 2012). The SADR proclamation has not been considered a valid exercise of the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination. See further GA Res. 33/31 (A); 34/37; 35/19; 36/46.
\textsuperscript{51} See Convention concerning the State frontier established between the Islamic Republic Mauritania and the Kingdom of Morocco (signed at Rabat on 14 April 1976), 1035 UNTS 120.
\textsuperscript{52} The Mauritanio-Sahraoui agreement (signed at Algiers on 10 August 1979) is annexed to Letter dated 18 August 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/34/427–S/13503.
\textsuperscript{53} See further the website of the Moroccan government at \url{http://www.maroc.ma/NR/exeres/7D7EAFC9-FE7C-4B33-806E-9059FE2C749D.htm} (last accessed 19 February 2012).
address the future status of Western Sahara but without any tangible results. An important obstacle has been Morocco’s categorical insistence over time that Western Sahara forms an integral part of its territory. In 1990-91, the Security Council approved the so-called ‘Settlement Plan’ which proposed a free and democratic referendum in Western Sahara – supervised by a UN mission (MINURSO) – and entailing a choice between independence and integration with Morocco based on the 1974 Spanish census.\(^{55}\) This plan did not ultimately meet with Moroccan approval.

In 2001, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, former US Secretary of State, Mr. James A. Baker III, introduced an ill-conceived plan that envisaged ‘the preservation of the territorial integrity against secessionist attempts whether from within or without the territory’ and proposed integration of Western Sahara into Morocco with a degree of autonomy.\(^{56}\) In 2003, a revised Baker plan was introduced which contemplated a free choice for Western Saharans between independence, integration and autonomy subject to certain modalities.\(^{57}\) The Security Council expressed its support for the plan as the ‘optimal political solution’.\(^{58}\) The Frente Polisario cautiously supported the plan but Morocco rejected it. Morocco explained in categorical terms yet again that it could only accept a solution that recognized the ‘colonial hiatus’ and ‘preserve[d] its sovereignty and territorial integrity’.\(^{59}\) Morocco would soon introduce such a proposal.

In April 2007, emphasizing its ‘commitment to a final political solution’, Morocco formally introduced to the Security Council ‘an autonomy proposal for the Sahara, within the [constitutional] framework of the Kingdom’s sovereignty and national unity’.\(^{60}\) The


\(^{56}\) Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2001/613 (‘Baker Plan I’, art. 2).

\(^{57}\) Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2003/565 (‘Baker Plan II’).

\(^{58}\) SC Res. 1495 (2003). See also Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2003/1016.

\(^{59}\) See Letter dated 24 September 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2004/760, paras. 9 and 28.

autonomy proposal would be subject to a referendum by the local population. The Frente Polisario rejected the autonomy proposal and maintained its commitment to the second Baker Plan subject to a number of guarantees. The Security Council took note of both proposals and called on the parties ‘to enter into negotiations without preconditions’. These negotiations are still continuing. This overview prompts a number of brief observations.

Morocco’s official position since at least the 1950s (and repeated on numerous occasions since) is clear: Western Sahara forms an integral part of Morocco. Indeed, Morocco has legislated to incorporate Western Sahara and today it forms part of four of its sixteen administrative regions. In short, Morocco is de jure claiming the status of territorial sovereign in Western Sahara. It follows that Morocco has categorically ruled out the option of independence in any future status negotiations on Western Sahara. While it may be true that the precise modalities of implementation of the right of self-determination remain somewhat unclear, what Judge Petrén in Western Sahara termed its ‘guiding principles’ (at least in the traditional decolonization context with which we are here concerned) are nevertheless well-established in ICJ jurisprudence and State practice.

The traditional law of self-determination does not guarantee a particular outcome or method of reaching that outcome but it does ensure the free choice of a people to determine its future territorial status. This is what the ICJ in Western Sahara referred to as the ‘essential feature’ of the right of self-determination. It constitutes the irreducible core of the right. It therefore seems clear that Morocco’s seemingly irreversible position, as a minimum, ‘severely impedes’ the exercise of the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination as affirmed by the ICJ in Western Sahara and is a breach of Morocco’s obligation to respect that erga omnes right. There is a real risk that the status quo will consolidate and ultimately prevail through international acquiescence with the

61 Ibid.
65 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep (2004), p. 184, para. 122.
inexorable passage of time.

It is in order to prevent such possible erosion – or even complete disintegration – of the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination that States are under an obligation not to recognize Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara. Nevertheless, the EC-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement provides a recent illustration of State practice that might potentially confer a degree of recognition on Morocco’s irredentist claim to status. Before we turn to an assessment of the FPA, however, a few general observations about the obligation of non-recognition are warranted.

III. The Obligation of Non-Recognition

The obligation of non-recognition of an unlawful situation is in large part based on the well-established general principle that legal rights cannot derive from an illegal situation (*ex injuria jus non oritur*). In an ‘essentially bilateral minded’ international legal order, however, with relatively weak enforcement mechanisms, this principle is subject to ‘considerable strain and to wide exceptions’. This important qualification delineates the contours of the principle of non-recognition in significant ways. Considerable strain is caused by an apparent antinomy of legality (*ex injuria jus non oritur*) and effectiveness (*ex factis jus oritur*). This is especially relevant where unlawful situations are maintained for extended periods of time, for example in case of forcible annexation of territory. As John Adams once observed, facts are stubborn things. Even Portugal in *East Timor* appears to have partly accepted that ‘it is what happens over time and the legal qualification of facts-through-time that is legally relevant.’ An unlawful situation may thus be ‘cured’ or validated over time through a gradual process of waiver, acquiescence

---

and prescription.\textsuperscript{71} The Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara is no exception.

In 2006, after four decades of a normative dead-end, the UN Secretary-General finally accepted ‘the political reality that no one was going to force Morocco to give up its claim of sovereignty over Western Sahara’; accordingly, ‘obliging Morocco to accept a referendum with independence as one of the options was … unrealistic’.\textsuperscript{72} The Secretary-General specifically pointed to the recently concluded 2006 EC-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement as evidence that as ‘the impasse continues, the international community unavoidably grows more accustomed to Moroccan control over Western Sahara.’\textsuperscript{73} It was equally clear to the Secretary-General, however, that the United Nations could not endorse a plan that excluded a referendum with independence as an option while claiming to provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. A new approach was evidently required.

As a way out of the impasse, the Secretary-General proposed that the United Nations should be ‘taking a step back’ and hand over ‘responsibility’ to Morocco and the Frente Polisario who should have recourse to direct negotiations without preconditions.\textsuperscript{74} He explained that

Their objective should be to accomplish what no ‘plan’ could, namely to work out a \textit{compromise between international legality and political reality} that would produce a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{75}

More specifically, the Secretary-General observed that:

\textsuperscript{71} In practice, such a process may be illustrated by the examples of the Indonesian province of West Irian (now West Papua) and India’s state of Goa.
\textsuperscript{72} Reports of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN Docs. S/2006/249 and S/2006/817, paras. 32 and 13, respectively.
\textsuperscript{73} Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2006/817, para. 20.
\textsuperscript{74} Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2006/249, para. 34.
\textsuperscript{75} Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2006/249, para. 34 (emphasis added).
The Security Council would not be able to invite parties to negotiate about Western Saharan autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, for such wording would imply recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which was out of the question as long as no States Member of the United Nations had recognized that sovereignty.\(^{76}\)

In 2007, the newly appointed Secretary-General came to the same conclusion.\(^{77}\) In the same year, the Security Council endorsed this approach and called on the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions.\(^{78}\)

In December 2010, the Security Council adopted resolution 1920 by which it took note of Morocco’s 2007 autonomy proposal and welcomed its ‘serious and credible efforts to move the process forward towards resolution.’ At the same time, the Security Council also endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendation that ‘realism and a spirit of compromise’ should guide the status negotiations.\(^{79}\) In plain terms, as France stated in the Security Council debate before the adoption of resolution 1920, this realist formula effectively meant treating the Moroccan autonomy proposal as ‘the basis for credible, open and constructive negotiations that respect the principle of self-determination.’\(^{80}\) In effect, a position not far removed from implicit recognition. The United Nations thus appears to have concluded that the answer to the decolonization of Western Sahara should be found in a compromise between international legality and political reality – a position that not only seems to contradict the essential right of the people of Western Sahara to freely determine their own future status but also constitutes an implicit recognition of Morocco’s claim to title.

As a minimum, the rationale of the obligation of non-recognition is to prevent, in so far as possible, the validation of an unlawful situation by seeking to ensure that a fait accompli resulting from serious illegalities do not consolidate and crystallize over time

\(^{76}\) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, UN Doc. S/2006/249, para. 37 (emphasis added).


\(^{78}\) SC Res. 1754 (2007).


\(^{80}\) UN Doc. S/PV.6305, p. 5 (statement by France).
into situations recognized by the international legal order – a concern recently expressed by the ICJ in the *Wall Advisory Opinion*. As Lauterpacht has observed, the function of non-recognition is to vindicate the ‘legal character of international law against the ‘law-creating effect of facts’. 

The obligation of non-recognition of an unlawful situation is set out in Article 41(2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility in the following terms:

No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach [by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law] …

The ILC’s definition of the principle is based on three interrelated elements. First, all peremptory norms may in principle give rise to an obligation of non-recognition. Second, only a serious breach of a peremptory norm is subject to the obligation of non-recognition. Third, the principle of non-recognition is only applicable where a serious breach of a peremptory norm specifically results in the assertion of a legal claim to status or rights by the wrongdoing State – ‘a situation’ all States are obligated not to recognize ‘as lawful’. It finds support in international practice and in decisions of the ICJ and reflects ‘a well-established practice’ which forms part of customary international law. In contrast, Article 41(2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility does not elaborate the content of the obligation of non-recognition. Let us briefly consider these three elements in the light of Morocco’s purported annexation of Western Sahara.

The right to self-determination is ‘clearly accepted and recognized’ as a peremptory

---

81 *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, ICJ Rep (2004), p. 184, para. 121.
norm under general international law.\textsuperscript{85} It is also well-established that States are under an obligation to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples of their right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{86} International courts and tribunals have confirmed that forcible territorial acquisitions, including the forcible denial of self-determination, constitute the unlawful situation \textit{par excellence} proscribed by the obligation of non-recognition under customary international law.\textsuperscript{87} Almost by definition, the forcible denial of self-determination, especially where maintained over an extended period of time, constitutes a serious and systematic breach of a peremptory norm.\textsuperscript{88} However, as Judge Kooijmans rightly observed in the \textit{Wall Advisory Opinion}, the purpose of the obligation of non-recognition is not to deny the existence of facts.\textsuperscript{89} It is not a quixotic principle aimed at fighting windmills. Rather, the principle applies to the extent that an unlawful ‘situation’ flowing from the breach of a peremptory norm results in a legal claim to status or rights by the wrongdoing State. It is this ‘situation’ that States are under an obligation not to recognize ‘as legal’. The conduct proscribed for third States by the obligation of non-recognition is a separate question.

Article 41(2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility does not elaborate the content of the obligation of non-recognition and international courts and tribunals as well as the political organs of the United Nations have been reluctant to develop relevant criteria beyond concrete cases. Hence Spain’s observation that the content of the obligation of non-recognition ‘remains largely undefined’.\textsuperscript{90} As Spain suggested, it is true that it is difficult to determine with confidence precisely what conduct is proscribed. A few basic points nevertheless seem clear. The ILC commentary notes that the obligation of non-recognition ‘not only refers to the formal recognition of [situations created by the

\textsuperscript{85} See para. 3 of the commentary to what became article 53 VCLT, YbILC (1966), vol. II, p. 248; paras. 4 and 5 of the commentaries to articles 26 and 40 ARSIWA respectively, ILC Report (2001), UN Doc. A/56/10, pp. 85, 112-113.
\textsuperscript{86} For a recent reaffirmation see \textit{Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory}, ICJ Rep (2004), pp. 171-172, para. 88 (citing GA Res. 2625 (XXV)).
\textsuperscript{87} See e.g. \textit{Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory}, ICJ Rep (2004), 171, para. 87.
\textsuperscript{88} See e.g. para. 8 of the commentary to article 40 ARSIWA, ILC Report (2001), UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory}, ICJ Rep (2004), Sep. Op., Judge Kooijmans, p. 232, para. 44.
\textsuperscript{90} See Comments and Observations from States on State Responsibility (19 March 2001), UN Doc. A/CN.4/515, p. 54 (Spain).
relevant breaches], but also prohibits acts which would imply such recognition.\textsuperscript{91} This position is explicitly based on the ICJ’s advisory opinion in \textit{Namibia}, and was reaffirmed by the Court in the \textit{Wall Advisory Opinion}.\textsuperscript{92} This clarification of the content of the principle is significant since there has to date been no formal recognition of Morocco’s \textit{de jure} claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara.

As is well-known, the ICJ in \textit{Namibia} provided several examples of acts which may imply recognition of a State’s purported annexation of a NSGT.\textsuperscript{93} In short, such recognition may result from any act by which a State purports to exercise territorial sovereignty over a NSGT. In \textit{Island of Palmas}, Judge Huber famously emphasized the inextricable link between sovereignty and territory.\textsuperscript{94} In a well-known passage, he observed that:

> Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State. The development of the national organisation of States during the last few centuries and, as a corollary, the development of international law, have established this principle of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own territory.\textsuperscript{95}

A prime example of such a function of a State is its capacity to enter into treaties. In relation to that portion of the surface of the globe where the State lawfully exercises territorial sovereignty, its treaty-making competence will normally be exclusive. In \textit{Wimbledon}, the PCIJ stated that ‘the right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty.’\textsuperscript{96} This classic conception of the relationship between territory and sovereignty remains the basis for two basic principles of treaty law. Indeed, the capacity to enter into treaties remains one of the most emblematic attributes of State

\textsuperscript{91} See para. 5 of the commentary to article 41 ARSIWA, ILC Report (2001), UN Doc. A/56/10, p. 114 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory}, ICJ Rep (2004), p. 200, para. 159.


\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Island of Palmas} (Netherlands/United States), Award of 4 April 1928, 2 RIIA, p. 829.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid. at 838.

\textsuperscript{96} PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 1 (1923), p. 25.
sovereignty and finds expression in Article 6 VCLT.\textsuperscript{97} It is complemented by Article 29 VCLT on the territorial scope of treaties which contains a presumption in favour of territorial sovereignty. In sum, there is an intimate link between treaty making capacity and territorial sovereignty.

By parity of reasoning, it follows from the absence of any formal recognition by third States of Morocco’s legal claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara – that is, a claim to status incompatible with the basic right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination – that Morocco cannot \textit{a priori} claim a \textit{general} treaty-making capacity akin to a territorial sovereign in matters relating to Western Sahara. This position is reinforced by the observation that a NSGT is a separate legal entity under international law with attendant (albeit limited) legal personality.\textsuperscript{98} Any putative Moroccan claim to general treaty-making capacity should therefore be construed as an implicit \textit{legal} claim to territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara – which third States are obligated not to recognize – unless it can be determined that a specific provision of international law recognizes the existence of some limited Moroccan treaty making capacity over Western Sahara. As Norway recently observed:

\begin{quote}
Norway’s consistent view is that Morocco does not exercise internationally recognised sovereignty with regard to Western Sahara. As a point of departure, therefore, Morocco does not have the right to exploit the area’s resources as if they were its own.\textsuperscript{99}
\end{quote}

Let us therefore finally consider in turn whether (1) the 2006/2011 EC-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement purports to apply to Western Sahara, (2) whether, if in the affirmative, Morocco can exceptionally claim some limited treaty-making capacity for the FPA or (3) whether the FPA constitutes an implicit legal claim to sovereignty over


\textsuperscript{98} See GA Res 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.

Western Sahara and the obligation of non-recognition obtains.

IV. The EC-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement: Recognition of Morocco’s Claim to Sovereignty over Western Sahara?

On 28 February 2011, the European Community and Morocco agreed on a one-year temporary renewal of the protocol to a Fisheries Partnership Agreement originally concluded in May 2006 for a period of four years and which entered into force on 28 February 2007. In turn, the 2006 FPA replaced three earlier fisheries agreements between the parties that were similar in geographical scope. Under the FPA, Morocco has received EUR 144,4 million in financial compensation in exchange for certain fishing rights granted to EC vessels in “Moroccan waters”. The geographical scope of the FPA is circumscribed by Article 2(a) which defines the Moroccan fishing zone as ‘the waters falling within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the Kingdom of Morocco’. The FPA provides only limited guidance on what this means.

In light of Morocco’s formal annexation of Western Sahara, the adoption of the 2006/2011 FPA has been controversial since – unlike the 2004 United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement and the 1997 EFTA-Morocco Free Trade Agreement – it does not explicitly exclude waters off the coast of Western Sahara from its territorial scope.


As it happens, the FPA provides complete geographical coordinates of all Moroccan fishing zones off its Atlantic coast with one notable exception. The southernmost geographical limit of the FPA (which delineates the area of exploitation of demersal and industrial pelagic fishing of up to 60,000 tonnes per year)\footnote{Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Communities and the Kingdom of Morocco, Appendix 2, Council Regulation (EC) No 764/2006 of 22 May 2006, in OJ L/141/29 (29 May 2006).} is defined merely as ‘South of 29\textdegree\ 00’N’.\footnote{Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Communities and the Kingdom of Morocco, Appendix 4, Council Regulation (EC) No 764/2006 of 22 May 2006, in OJ L/141/33 (29 May 2006).} This coordinate is located two degrees north of the internationally recognized maritime boundary between Morocco and Western Sahara fixed at 27\textdegree\ 40’ N.\footnote{See e.g. I. Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyklopedia (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1979), pp. 155-157; Legal Opinion of the Legal Service of European Parliament, 20 February 2006, SJ-0085/06, para. 31. This coordinate is also recognized in recent FAO statistics.} This geographical indication could mean either that certain fishing rights of EC vessels under the FPA are limited to a rather narrow strip of water north of Western Sahara – that is, in uncontested Moroccan waters – or that the southernmost geographical limit of the FPA extends to the commencement of Mauritanian waters at around 21\textdegree\ N. As it happens, the matter has been settled by the subsequent practice of the parties under the 2006 FPA in favour of the latter interpretation.

The European Commission has recognized on several occasions that demersal and industrial pelagic fishing by EC vessels is in fact taking place in the waters off the coast of Western Sahara.\footnote{See e.g. Reply from European Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to Written Question E-4425/08 (12 September 2008), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2008-4425&language=PL (last accessed 19 February 2012); Reply from the European Commission to Oral Question H-0079/09 (12 March 2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=QT&reference=H-2009-0079&language=MT (last accessed 19 February 2012).} Under the 2006 FPA, such fishing rights have been allocated to vessels from Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, the
Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{108}

The Commission, purportedly basing itself on a legal opinion by the UN Legal Counsel,\textsuperscript{109} has essentially argued that the FPA is consistent with international law since Morocco must be considered the \textit{de facto} administrating power in Western Sahara and the agreement takes into account the needs and interests of the people of Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{110} In essence, the Commission is suggesting that Morocco has acted within its limited treaty making capacity in relation to Western Sahara. The application of the FPA to Western Saharan waters is permissible and accordingly it does not entail an implicit recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara otherwise proscribed under international law. In theory, it is possible to conceive of at least three possible sources of limited treaty making capacity that would not imply such recognition.

First, Morocco would have limited treaty-making capacity in relation to Western Sahara in a putative capacity as administrating power under Chapter XI of the UN Charter. It is true that Morocco occasionally refers to the Madrid Declaration as the basis for its presence in Western Sahara as the ‘sole competent administrative authority’ in the territory.\textsuperscript{111} It is equally true that the UN and the EU treat Morocco as \textit{de facto} administrating power and that Spain’s official position since 2005 has even been to treat Morocco as \textit{de jure} administrating power.\textsuperscript{112} In reality, leaving aside Spain’s position that is as such incapable of producing any objective legal effect, this is nothing more than a statement of fact. Morocco has not formally claimed any status as administrating power

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{109}Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/161.
\item \textsuperscript{111}See e.g. Letter dated 26 January 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2006/52.
\item \textsuperscript{112}See e.g. Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/161; Legal Opinion from the Legal Service of the European Parliament, 20 February 2006, SJ-0086/06, para. 37; C. Ruiz Miguel, ‘Spain’s legal obligations as administrating power of Western Sahara’, in N. Botha \textit{et. al.} (eds.), \textit{Multilateralism and International Law with Western Sahara as a Case-Study} (Pretoria 2010), p. 208 (with further references to Spanish press reports).
\end{itemize}
under Chapter XI of the UN Charter; indeed, such a position would plainly contradict its categorical legal claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara. As of March 2011, the United Nations still recognized Spain as the sole administrating power in Western Sahara. The fact that Spain does not perform its obligations under Chapter XI of the UN Charter, including its reporting obligations under Article 73(e), is not decisive.

Second, Morocco could enter into treaties or other international agreements concerning the exploitation of natural resources with third States on behalf of Western Sahara if it did so on the basis of a valid expression of consent by the Frente Polisario, the legitimate representatives of the people of Western Sahara. No such consent has been given. In fact, the Frente Polisario has on several occasions vigorously protested that no exploitation of Western Saharan natural resources can take place without its express authorization.

Third, Morocco could potentially enjoy limited treaty making capacity in relation to Western Sahara under the law of belligerent occupation. Morocco does not accept the application of the law of belligerent occupation to Western Sahara, since that status would be prima facie incompatible with its claim to sovereignty over the territory. For example, in its fifth periodic report submitted to the Human Rights Committee in 2004, Morocco reaffirmed its compliance with the right to self-determination under Article 1 ICCPR by stating that it continued to

coopoperate closely with the United Nations in seeking a solution to the conflict in Moroccan Sahara while guaranteeing national sovereignty over the whole of Moroccan territory.

114 This status was first granted to the Frente Polisario by the United Nations in 1979. See GA Res. 34/37 of 21 November 1979, op. para. 7.
116 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/MAR/2004/5, p. 8, para. 39.
But this claim to territorial sovereignty has not been recognized as a matter of international law. In the 1970s, the UN General Assembly twice characterized Morocco’s presence in Western Sahara as belligerent occupation.\footnote{GA Res. 34/37 of 21 November 1979; 35/19 of 11 November 1980; Letter from the President of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (and Secretary-General of the Frente Polisario) to the Editor of European Voice, 10 March 2011, ‘The (fishy) value that the EU places on democracy’, available at http://www.fishelsewhere.eu/files/dated/2011-03-10/european_voice_10.03.2011.pdf (last accessed 19 February 2012).} The fact that this term has not been repeated in subsequent resolutions from the General Assembly or the Security Council is not decisive. The application of the law of belligerent occupation is largely a matter of fact dependent upon a demonstration of effective authority and control over a territory to which the occupying State holds no sovereign title. This understanding of occupation finds support in Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War which is widely accepted as forming part of general international law.

In the present case, Morocco’s effective authority and control over Western Sahara – poignantly expressed by its \textit{de jure} incorporation into Morocco – would appear to be sufficient to trigger the application of the general international law of occupation. As a recent example, Norway explicitly stated that the law of belligerent occupation applies in Western Sahara.\footnote{See statement dated 3 March 2011 by Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gahr Støre, reproduced at http://www.wsrw.org/index.php?parse_news=single&cat=105&art=1884 (last accessed 19 February 2012).} It is true that this legal regime may provide the occupying State with limited treaty making capacity in relation to the natural resources of the occupied territory.\footnote{See e.g. Articles 43 and 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations.} But in the case of Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara this putative treaty making capacity is more apparent than real.

In the \textit{Wall Advisory Opinion}, the ICJ considered the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law. The Court observed that some rights could be exclusively matters of either body of law or they might concurrently be subject to both bodies of law.\footnote{Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Rep (2004), p. 178, para. 106.} As it happened, the Court took into account both bodies of law in that case. In the present case, a similar situation obtains. The \textit{lex specialis}
expressed in the limited rights of the occupying State to exploit the natural resources of
the occupied territory of a NSGT under international humanitarian law must be
interpreted in accordance with peremptory human rights law, that is to say, the right of
peoples to self-determination.

In 1962, at the height of the era of decolonization, the General Assembly adopted
resolution 1803 (XVII) by which it affirmed the principle of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources as a ‘basic constituent of the right to self-determination’. In the
*Armed Activities* case, the ICJ recognized that this resolution forms part of general
international law. It follows that under both international humanitarian law and human
rights law, Moroccan exploitation of Western Saharan natural resources can only take
place in accordance with the peremptory norm of self-determination. It may be recalled
that the essential feature of that right is the autonomous will of the indigenous population.
In the absence of consent from the people of Western Sahara, Morocco does not have
treaty-making capacity and cannot exploit the natural resources of the territory.

Any Moroccan attempt to exploit these resources by international agreement
therefore gives rise to an unlawful situation – that is to say, a Moroccan legal claim to
sovereignty in denial of the right of the Western Saharan to self-determination – which
third States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal. Switzerland’s succinct
position on the territorial scope of application of the 1997 EFTA-Morocco Free Trade
Agreement is instructive:

> Since Switzerland does not recognise the Moroccan annexation, the
free trade agreement between EFTA and Morocco is not applicable for
Western Sahara.

---

121 GA Res. 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. For a recent reaffirmation see GA Res. 65/109 of 10
December 2010.

122 *Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)*, ICJ Rep
(2005), p. 168, at p. 251, para. 244. See also ibid. Dec Judge Koroma, para. 11; *East Timor*, ICJ Rep

123 Statement dated 6 April 2007 from the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, reproduced at
accessed 19 February 2012). The EFTA-Morocco Free Trade Agreement is available at
Put differently, Switzerland evidently considers that an extension of the agreement to Western Sahara would imply recognition of Morocco’s legal claim to sovereignty over the territory. This might explain Morocco’s account of the less obvious benefits of the FPA:


In sum, the FPA should be understood as an implicit recognition of Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara by at least twenty-two EU member States for which they bear several responsibility under international law as expressed in Article 47 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. However, it appears that any such wrongful conduct recently ceased.

In January 2012, EU Fisheries Commissioner Damanaki stated that the European Commission had tabled a new negotiating mandate for a renewed FPA with Morocco “in line with the position expressed by the EU Council and the vote in the European Parliament” and that “the Commission [is] committed to conclude a new protocol on that basis”\textsuperscript{127}. Although this is a positive development, it is noteworthy that the negotiating mandate in the relevant resolution adopted by the European Parliament – i.e. to ensure that the new agreement “fully respects international law and benefits all the local population groups affected” – is conspicuously silent on the wishes of the Western Saharans, an integral component of the principle of self-determination under international law. In any event, notwithstanding recent positive developments, the compatibility of any future EC-Morocco fisheries agreement with international law remains uncertain at this stage.

V. Concluding Observations

With the efflux of time, even the hardest of rocks will eventually wither and disintegrate into grains of sand. A similar process can be observed in international law. Even the hardcore of fundamental rules in the international legal landscape is capable of disintegration as a result of the inevitable force that ultimately shapes its configuration: State practice. Like the steady stream of water slowly eroding the stone, the efflux of time is having a similar effect on the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination – at least as originally envisaged by the principal UN organs. On the other hand, the purpose of the obligation of non-recognition is to prevent, in so far as possible, the occurrence of such a gradual process of erosion through waiver, acquiescence and prescription.


the international community is seeking the answer to the enduring question of the process of decolonization of Western Sahara in a compromise between international legality and political reality. The apparent assumption is that anything must be better than the impasse of the current *status quo*. Whatever the appeal of the siren-song of expediency, the current *laissez-faire* policy adopted by the United Nations appears to severely impede – and therefore contradict – the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination under international law. The UN policy is, in effect, not far removed from an implicit recognition of Morocco’s irredentist claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara.

It is against this background of creeping recognition of Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara that the EC position on the FPA should be understood. As we have seen above, the UN Secretary-General already made this link in 2006. In his own words, the international community has unavoidably grown more accustomed to Moroccan control over Western Sahara. The recent EC position on the FPA is a welcome exception to this state of affairs but it remains to be seen to what extent (if any) a future EC-Morocco fisheries agreement will respect international law and affect the gradual process of creeping recognition of Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara. It can only be hoped that the future decolonization process will be more firmly guided by the salutary words of Judge Dillard in *Western Sahara*: ‘It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.’

---