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International Trade and Investment Law: Inception, Separation and Engagement



Inception: Distinct Strategic Goals

- GATT 1947:
 - Multilateral compact to liberalize trade restrictions (and constrain beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the early 1930s)
 - Model of “embedded liberalism”
 - Sensitive balance between obligations and exceptions (including, but not limited to, GATT Article XX)



- **Bilateral Investment Treaties:**
 - Contingent reasons for creation of investment treaty protections from late 1960s to early 1970s
 - Developing state hostility to foreign investment rooted in both political (decolonization) and economic/developmental (infant industry) strategies
 - BIT country pairings classically divide between law “maker” and “taker”



- **GATT → WTO:**
 - Uruguay Round (1986-1993)
 - Expansion of subject-matter including foreign investment (GATS, mode III)
 - Strengthened dispute settlement (DSU)
- **Investment treaties**
 - Erosion of constitutive factors
 - Massive growth yet no real assessment of the shape and utility of the regime
 - Triadic structure: NAFTA Chapter 11



- Historical pathways
- Treaty forms
- Institutional locus
- Distinct activation of dispute settlement
- Sociological:
 - Negotiators
 - Practitioners
 - Scholars



1. Shared legal norms
 - Classically:
 - National and MFN treatment
 - Increasingly:
 - Avoidance of “hard conflict” (compulsory licensing)
 - Exceptions (often incorporated by reference):
GATT Art. XX/GATS Art. XIV
 - Experimentation:
 - 1998/2009 ASEAN investment treaties:
 - Special and differential treatment
 - Emergency safeguard measure



2. Shared jurisdictional reach

- Domestic taxes:
 - WTO Panel and AB: *Mexico – Soft Drinks*
 - ICSID tribunals: *ADM and Corn Products*
- Intellectual property regulation: Australian “plain tobacco” packaging legislation
- Subsidies:
 - WTO Panel: *U.S.-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act*
 - NAFTA Chapter 11: *Canfor v U.S* (Statement of claim)

3. Movement of actors

- Negotiators (especially within FTAs)
- Adjudicators
- Scholars (including as expert counsel)



4. Cross-fertilization of jurisprudence

- WTO → Investment Law:
 - National treatment (*SD Myers* and others)
 - Exceptions (*Continental v Argentina*)
- Investment Law → WTO:
 - Appellate Body, *U.S. – Stainless Steel*



- Methodology (hermeneutics)
 - Legitimacy of adjudication of competing values
 - Role of Appellate Body in building coherence and integrity of legal interpretation
 - Articles 31 and 32, *VCLT*
 - External norms: Article 31(3)(c), *VCLT*
- Procedural and systemic:
 - Non-disputing party submissions akin to WTO third party participation: e.g., Art. 10.20.2, CAFTA-DR Free Trade Agreement
 - Amicus
 - Tightening of qualifications of arbitrators
 - Contemplation of appellate mechanism



- Substantive:
 - National treatment
 - Investment case-law as a guide for WTO jurisprudence?
 - Fair and equitable treatment
 - *Chemtura v Canada*: SPS-like inquiry?
 - More broadly, shared debate on proportionality review
 - Exceptions:
 - *Continental v Argentina*: precise use of WTO law?
 - But also potential for investment law to guide WTO adjudication on the prudential exception in the GATS:
 - Especially as a check for disguised protectionism (*Fireman's Fund v Mexico* (2006) and *Saluka v Czech Republic* (2006))
- Secondary analysis:
 - What are the specific risks facing foreign investors and how should these be addressed by different treaty disciplines?
 - Role of inter-disciplinary insights (as in WTO law), especially political economy



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